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LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF PRACTICE
OF OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS
DAVID G. EPSTEIN*
Last year, three hundred and sixty men and women graduated from the
five osteopathic colleges in the United States.' To receive the doctor of osteo-
pathy degree, each completed at least three years of college work and four
years of study at the osteopathic college, spent five thousand hours of class-
room work in osteopathic college alone, finished a course of study virtu-
ally the same as offered at any allopathic medical school.2 And, each knows
that he cannot professionally visit a patient at most hospitals; that medical
doctors will not consult with him professionally; and that under the licensing
laws of some states, he is no more than a glorified masseur. This article
examines the limitations on the scope of practice of an osteopathic physician.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF OSTEOPATHY
Disillusioned with recognized medical practice because of the loss of
three of his children during an epidemic of spinal meningitis shortly after
the Civil War, Dr. Andrew Taylor Stills developed a new theory of structural
therapeutics which he called osteopathy. His theory was that the human
body was self-healing, containing within itself all of the elements necessary
for its maintenance. 4 He felt that all disease was due to abnormalities in
or near joints and that any disease could be treated by correction of these
abnormalities through manipulation. His ideas spread. In 1894, a college
to teach osteopathy was started. In 1917, at Still's death, there were more
than five thousand osteopathic physicians in the United States and abroad.5
*BA., 1964, University of Texas at Austin; LL.B. 1966, University of Texas
at Austin; Texas Bar; law clerk, Texas Supreme Court; Associate in the firm of
Kramer, Roche, Burch, Streich & Cracchiolo of Phoenix, Arizona.
1. Mills, Osteopathic Education, 19 J. AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC Ass'N, 531, 533(1967).
2. Ibid.
3. His medical education was that of most doctors of his day, that is, he
served an apprenticeship. For a history of the founder of osteopathy see G.
NORTHUP, OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE: AN AMERICAN REFORMATION ch. 2 (1966); A. T.
STILL, AUTOBIoGRAPHY (1897); Young, Rising Fortunes of Bone Setters, Life, Sept.
26, 1960, at 108.
4. See PAGE, PRINCIPLES OF OSTEOPATHY (1952).
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In the half century since Still's demise, osteopathy has undergone con-
siderable change. The number of osteopaths in the United States is now over
ten thousand.6 The quality of the education afforded by an osteopathic col-
lege has greatly improved. Osteopathic theory-while still stressing manipu-
lation-now encompasses surgery and pharmacology.7 These changes8 have
resulted in a measure of increased recognition for the osteopathic physician.9
However, numerous limitations on his scope of practice remain.
II. STATE LICENsING LAws
The right to practice medicine is not an absolute right. A state0 in
the exercise of its police power may impose whatever regulation neces-
sary to protect the people from being mistreated or mislead by incompetent
or unscrupulous practitioners. Accordingly, all fifty states have enacted leg-
islation regulating the practice of medicine. 1 Thirty years ago it was gen-
erally provided by statute and held that an osteopath could neither give
or prescribe drugs nor perform surgical operations.' 2 However, as the field
of osteopathy has developed to embrace drugs and surgery as well as
manipulation, the state laws as to scope of practice by a doctor of osteopathy
have changed.
Today in thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia it is possible
for an individual osteopath to obtain a license which will permit him to use
6. See L. MILLS, THE OSTEOPATHIC PROFESSION AND ITS COLLEGES (1965).
7. Ibid.
8. Osteopaths contend that the transformation in philosophy has not been
great-that osteopathy has always been more than manipulation. See Mills, op.
cit. supra, note 6, at page 3.
9. For example, by executive order on January 18, 1966, President Johnson
called for doctors of osteopathy in the draft; osteopathic students are eligible for
federal aid under the Health Professional Assistance Act of 1963; osteopathic col-
leges have been approved for federal construction funds under the Hill-Burton
Hospital Survey and Construction Act.
10. Congress does not have the power to regulate the practice of medicine in
the several states. See Du Vall v. Board of Medical Examiners of Arizona, 49
Ariz. 329, -66 P.2d 1026 (1937); 41 Am. Jur., Physicians and Surgeons § 7 (1942).
It can, of course, regulate the practice of medicine and surgery within the District
of Columbia. See, e.g., U.S. v. American Medical Ass'n., 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940), 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons § 3 at
821 (1951).
11. See 41 Am. Jur., Physicians and Surgeons § 26 (1942); 70 C.J.S., Physicians
and Surgeons § 15 (1951); Note, Physicians and Surgeons-Statutes or Osteopaths-
Limitation of Practice, 47 MicH. L. REv. 565 (1949); Note, State Recognition
of Doctors of Osteopathy compared with State Recognition of Doctors of Medicine,
31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 286 (1956); see generally S. SHINDELL, LAW IN MEDIcAL
PRAcTmcE 9-15 (1966).
12. See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 623, 626 (1933).
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medicine and surgery in his practice.13 In California, a recently enacted
statute prevents the issuance of any kind of license to practice to osteo-
pathic physicians.' 4 In Nebraska, almost all doctors of osteopathy now
hold unlimited licenses, but, at present, no additional licenses are being
issued.' 5 The law under which these osteopaths were licensed expired,' 6
and in 1963 the Nebraska legislature enacted a law providing that DO.'s
graduated from osteopathic schools approved by the Department of Health
could qualify for unlimited licenses if they passed the examination of the
Board of Examiners in Medicine and Surgery.' 7 The osteopathic colleges
were inspected, and all were rejected.'x In the remaining nine states, osteo-
paths are still restricted completely, that is no doctor of osteopathy may
obtain a license to prescribe drugs or perform surgery.' 9 In a majority of
these states, the restrictions are imposed by the legislature,20 but in three
of them courts have interpreted statutes, which seemingly extend equality
to osteopaths, in a manner so as to severely limit their scope of practice 2 ',
Georgia is a good example. There the statute provides:
The license provided for in this Chapter shall authorize the holder
to practice osteopathy as taught and practiced in the legally in-
corporated and reputable colleges of osteopathy, as provided for
in this Chapter ... 22
13. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
14. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3600. See Committee on Osteopathy and Medi-
cine, American Medical Association, The Story of the Unification of M.D.'s and
D.O.'s in California; Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons of California, Why Are
There So Few Osteopathic Doctors in California Today.
15. Letter from Langdon Ann Collins to David Epstein, May 1, 1967.
16. Neb. Laws 1927, c. 167, § 119.
17. Neb. Gen. Laws c. 366 § 1 (1965).
18. At almost the same time, a distinguished team of M.D.'s and D.O.'s
from Minnesota, acting pursuant to similar legislation, inspected and approved all
of the osteopathic colleges. See Letter from Dr. George Taylor, member of the
Nebraska Board of Examiners in Medicine and Surgery, to R. K. Kirkman, Di-
rector, Nebraska Bureau of Examining Boards, November 22, 1965.19. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, and South Carolina. Some of the licensing laws make little
sense. South Carolina's is an excellent example of this. There osteopaths have
minor surgery and obstetrical rights but they cannot prescribe drugs. It would
be difficult to imagine minor surgery or childbirth without drugs.20. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 72-906 (1947); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3 7-111c-37-1123(1950); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 477 (1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 8891 (1942);
N. D. Rev. Code § 43-1401 (1943); S. C. Code Ann. § 56-1101 (1962).
21. Georgia, Idaho, and North Carolina.
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Every reputable college of osteopathy teaches surgery and pharmacology.28
Yet the Georgia Supreme Court in Mabry v. State Board of Examiners
in Optometry,24 indicated that an osteopath in Georgia could neither pre-
scribe drugs nor perform surgery.
Ten states or forty states are wrong. Either the former group is unduly
limiting the scope of practice of an osteopathic physician or the latter
has not imposed sufficient restrictions. John Doe, D.O., a graduate of
Kirksville College of Osteopathy and living in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
is as competent as John Doe, D.O., graduate of Kirksville College of
Osteopathy and Surgery, living in St. Louis, Missouri.
As a practical matter, licensing laws are the most minor form of
restriction on the osteopathic physician's scope of practice. More than
95% of the osteopaths practicing in the United States today are located
in states in which it is possible for them to obtain unlimited licenses.
2 5
The following two sections of this article deal with restrictions which affect
virtually all osteopaths.
III. Coum-y MEDICAL SOCIETIES
Virtually every practicing M.D. belongs to the medical society of
the county in which he practices. 28 The advantages of such membership
can most easily be understood by examining some of the disadvantages of
non-membership. Non-members are ineligible for some specialty boards;
2T
members of medical societies are prohibited from having professional re-
lations with doctors whose membership applications have been rejected;8
and, most important, the non-member will be denied the use of many hos-
pitals.29 At present, very few osteopathic physicians belong to county med-
ical associations. Until 1961, such membership was impossible. Section
three of the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Asso-
23. See Mills, Osteopathic Education, 19 J. AMza. OSTEOPATHIC Ass'N 531
(1967).
24. 190 Ga. 751, 10 S.E.2d 740 (1940). The general counsel for the American
Osteopathic Association is of the opinion that Mabry is read as deciding only the
issue before the court: whether an osteopath can practice optometry without a
license. See Letter from Langdon Ann Collins to David Epstein, May 1, 1967;
contra Note, State Recognition of Doctors of Osteopathy Compared with State
Recognition of Doctors of Medicine, 31 NoTrE DAmtE LAW. 286, 293 (1956).
25. American Medical Association, Report on Current Status of Osteopaths,
p. 11.
26. See Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and
Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 939 (1954).
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ciation prohibits as unethical voluntary professional associations with
cultists.3 0 Until 1961,11 osteopaths were regarded as cultists; in that year,
the American Medical Association House of Delegates adopted a report
to the effect that state medical societies could decide for themselves
whether their members could voluntarily associate with osteopathic physi-
cians. 32 To date, seventeen states33 have determined that voluntary pro-
fessional relations with doctors of osteopathy are ethical. In these states,
however, at best, a handful of osteopaths have been admitted to full
membership in county medical societies. Thus it is necessary to consider
whether an osteopath has a legal right to be admitted to full membership
in a county medical association.
It has long been settled that courts are loath to interfere in the internal
affairs of private voluntary organizations. 4 No early reported decision enun-
ciates the reasons for such a rule; instead, the courts make statements
such as "courts are indisposed to interfere'3 5 and "it is much wiser .. .
that the court should hold aloof."3 6 The underlying bases for the non-inter-
vention policy were first set forth by Professor Chafee in a now classic
law review article;3 7 he discussed at length three policies that underlie the
judicial reluctance: (1) interpretation of ritual, obscure rules and doctrines
might be too laborious; (2) judicial interference may be the cause of much
resentment among members of the association involved; (3) growth of
30. Cultists is defined as "one who in his practice follows a tenet or principle
based on the authority of its promulgator to the exclusion of demonstration and
scientific experience." Special Report of the Judicial Council, Osteopathy-JAMA,
Sept. 16, 1961, at p ..........
31. In 1955, the American Medical Association's Cline Committee composed
of medical educators visited the osteopathic colleges and recommended that the
cultist label be removed. See Report of the Committee for the Study of Relations
Between Osteopathy and Medicine, 158 JAMA 736 (1955). The American Medical
Association House of Delegates Reference Committee majority report approved
removal of the label. One doctor who did not want the cultist designation removed
filed a minority report. The minority report was approved by the House of Dele-
gates.
32. American Medical Association, Report on Current Status of Osteopathy.
33. Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
34. See Annot., 137 A.L.R. 311 (1942). Rex v. Gray's Inn, 1 Doug. 353, 99
Eng.Rep. 227 (K.B. 1780), is one of the earliest reported cases in point; there it
was held that mandamus would not lie to compel the members of one of the Inns
of Court to admit the movant because the Inn was a voluntary association.
35. Local Union No. 57, Etc. v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 234, 16 So2d 705, 711
(1944).
36. Hussey v. Gallagher, 61 Ga. 86, 94 (1878).
37. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Hv.
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free associations is beneficial to our society.88 Because of these policies,
every court which considered the question prior to 1960 held that it
could not compel membership in a county medical society.39
However, even in early cases, courts overcame their "awe" of vol-
untary organizations when a member previously in good standing of a
medical society was suspended or expelled.40 Traditionally three rationales
have been used as bases for judicial intervention and relief: contract,
property, and procedural standards.41 Under the contract theory, the con-
stitution and by-laws of the voluntary association constitute a contract
between the member and the organization. Discipline can be imposed
only for offenses defined in the contract, and then only if the provisions
are not contrary to law or public policy.42 This theory has been criticized
on many grounds by numerous legal writers;43 its primary shortcoming is
that it is simply inadequate. Most organizations word offenses in such
vague terms that virtually any conduct can be punished." As its name
implies, the property theory requires that plaintiff's expulsion deprive
him of a "property" interest;45 otherwise he does not have a justifiable
38. Professor Chafee assigned a colorful, descriptive name to each of the
policies. He identified them, respectively, as the "Dismal Swamp," the "Hot
Potato," and the "Living Tree." Id. at 1021-23.
39. See Medical Society of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d
321 (1944); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068, 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920, n.w.h.);
State ex rel Hartigan v. Monogalia County Medical Society, 97 W.Va. 273, 124
S.E. 826 (1924). The language in Walker is especially strong; the court said:
The courts cannot compel the admission of an individual into such an
association (county medical society) and if his application is refused, he
is entirely without legal remedy, no matter how arbitrary, or unjust may
be his exclusion. 16 So.2d at 324.
40. See, e.g., Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 531 (1951); 70 C.J.S., Physicians and
Surgeons § 80(h) (1951); Comment, Medical Societies and Medical Service Plans
-from the Law of Associations to the Law of Antitrust, 22 U. CaL. L. REv. 694,
697 et seq. (1955).
41. Legal writers have advocated additional theories. See, e.g., Chafee, The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REy. 993, 1007 et seq.
(1930) (tort); 41 MNN. L. REv. 212, 213 (1957) (public policy). Only the three
theories enumerated in the text have received judicial support.
42. See Medical Soc. of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321(1944); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App.2d
241, 293 P.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Comment, Medical Societies and Medi-
cal Service Plans-From the Law of Associations to the Law of Antitrust 22
U. CaI. L. REv. 694, 698 (1955).
43. See, e.g., Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAv.
L. REv. 993 (1930); 5 UTAH L. REv. 270 (1956); Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in
Private Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L. J. 369 (1956). These same writers are
equally critical of the property theory.
44. Cf. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HIv. L. REV.
1049, 1061 (1951).
45. The courts are at odds as to what constitutes a property interest. Somejurisdictions require a severable property right. See Gregg v. Massachusetts Medi-
19671
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interest. This explanation of the property theory exposes its primary defect
-absent a property right, the court can do nothing; there may be serious
injuries without loss of any property right. Under the third theory, a
court balances the procedural requirements for expulsion against general
notions of procedural due process. This theory has been used in a limited
number of cases, and in each of them, the court has first found a property
right.48
Finally, in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society,47 a court
did away with this expulsion/exclusion distinction. Recognizing that the
loss is the same whether one is expelled or excluded,48 the New Jersey
court ordered a county medical society to admit an applicant into mem-
bership. Because Falcone may one day become the osteopathic physician's
password into county medical societies, a detailed examination of the case
is in order.
In 1946, Italo Falcone received the degree of Doctor of Osteopathy
from an osteopathic college, not approved by the American Medical Asso-
ciation. 49 After serving internship and residency in osteopathic hospitals,
he passed the New Jersey State Board medical examination and received
an unlimited license to practice medicine and surgery in the state. In
1951, Falcone attended the University of Milan, Italy-a medical school
recognized by the American Medical Association-for seven months.
The school gave him credit for his osteopathic studies and awarded him
the degree of Doctor of Medicine. In the latter part of 1953, Falcone was
admitted to the Middlesex County Medical Society as an associate mem-
cal Society, 111 Mass. 185, 15 Am. Rep. 24 (1872); State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson
County Medical Society, 295 Mo. 144, 243 S.W. 341 (1922); Weyrens v. Scotts
Bluff County Medical Society, 133 Neb. 814, 277 N.W. 378 (1938). The test for a
severable property right is whether there is a pecuniary right which plaintiff's
heirs or creditors can reach. Other jurisdictions do not require a severable property
right. See Medical and Surgical Society of Montgomery County v. Weatherly, 75
Ala. 248 (1883); State v. Georgia Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408
(1869); People v. Medical Society of the County of Erie, 24 Barb. 577 (1857).
46. See Reid v. Medical Society, 156 N.Y.S. 780 (1915), aff'd without opinion,
177 App. Div. 939, 103 N.Y.S. 1129 (1917); People v. Medical Society of the
County of Erie 24 Barb. 577 (1857); Brown v. Harris County Medical Society,
194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
47. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (Law Div. 1960), aff'd., 34 N.J. 581,
170 A.2d 791 (1961). A subsequent New Jersey case seems to limit Falcone to
situations where the voluntary association has a monopoly. See Higgins v. Ameri-
can Soc. of Clinical Pathologists, 94 NJ. Super. 243, 227 A.2d 712 (App. Div.
1967).
48. 162 A.2d at 330. The New Jersey Supreme Court decision simply ignored
the traditional distinction between exclusion and expulsion.
49. It is perhaps redundant to say: "osteopathic college, not approved by the
American Medical Association" since no osteopathic college has been approved by
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ber for a two year probationary period.50 The society later learned of his
osteopathic background and in 1956 refused to admit him into active
membership and deleted his name from the associate member list. As a
result of the society's action, two hospitals in the area terminated Falcone's
staff membership and visit privileges. Falcone exhausted his internal rem-
edies and brought an action in lieu of mandamus against the Middlesex
County Medical Society requesting that the society be required to admit
him into full membership. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a
decree ordering such action.
It is somewhat difficult to ascertain the basis of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's holding.51 The major part of the opinion is rationalization for judicial
intervention in the membership affairs of a private association. 2 In this
regard, the court relied heavily on labor cases ordering unions with closed
shops to either admit all non-members or waive the compulsory union-
ism provisions as to them.5 3 The situations are analogous: exclusion from
a closed shop costs a worker his job; exclusion from the Middlesex Medical
Society had virtually the same effect on Falcone. It prevented him from
privileges in the accredited hospitals in the area, virtually precluding his
practice of medicine. 54
50. Associate membership in the Middlesex County Medical Society is a
preliminary status and confers no right to election. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 5-6,
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 581, 170 A.2d 791 (1962).
51. The opinion of the intermediate appellate court is much clearer. It set
forth the following rule:
[Wlhere an organization is in fact involuntary and/or is of such a nature
that the court should intervene to protect the public, and where an ex-
clusion results in a substantial injury to a plaintiff, the court will grant
relief providing that such exclusion was contrary to the organization's own
laws, was without procedural safeguards, or the application of a particular
law or laws of an organization was contrary to public policy. See 162 A.2d
at 331.
Under this rule there are three different situations in which a court will grant
relief. In each of them, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of the organiza-
tion and the injury to plaintiff resulting from the exclusion; in addition, the court
must find either (1) violation of the organization's own rule; (2) absence of pro-
cedural safeguards; or (3) organization laws contrary to public policy.
52. See 170 A.2d 795-799.
53. See, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944);
Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J.Eq. 347, 197 At]. 720
(Ch. 1938).
54. The intermediate appellate court found that:
As a practical matter it (the Middlesex County Medical Society) is virtual-
ly an institution that controls the practice of medicine in the hospitals
located within this county. Membership in defendant society is essential
for any doctor wishing to freely and fully pursue his profession in Middle-
sex County. 162 A.2d at 332.
It mentioned the following facts to support this holding: (1) the joint commission
on accreditation of hospitals was composed entirely of medical society members;
1967]
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After deciding that intervention was warranted, the Falcone court
promulgated the following rule:
When .. . [the society's] action has no relation to the advance-
ment of medical science or the elevation of professional standards,
but runs strongly counter to the public policy of our State and the
true interests of justice it should be and will be stricken down.55
Applying the rule, it concluded that the unwritten by-law requiring four
years of study at an AMA approved school has no reasonable relationship
to the purposes of the society in a case such as Dr. Falcone's.5 6
Student writers have criticized the New Jersey court for making an
unwarranted finding that an osteopathic education is equal to a medical
one.57 They contend that a court is ill-equipped to make such a determina-
tion and great weight should be given to the society's own determination.
While perhaps a court is not the proper tribunal to evaluate medical edu-
cations, neither is a county medical society. It is well recognized that much
of organized medicine's opposition to osteopathic practitioners is based
on financial considerations."" The proper body to evaluate the two schools
of healing is the state legislature. In New Jersey, the legislature has made
such a determination. It has determined that graduates of osteopathic col-
(2) by virtue of a rule of this commission, society membership is a requisite forhospital staff membership; (3) deviation from the rule results in loss of accredita-
tion for a hospital.
The situation in New Jersey is not at all atypical. A study made by the
Yale Law Journal in 1954 indicated that in some states hospitals with up to a
combined total of 99% of the total bed capacity in the state required membership
in the local medical society. See Note, The American 'Medical Association: Power,
Purpose and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 953 (1954); cf.
W. J. CumRAN, LAw AND MEDICINE 676-679 (1960); S. GREENBERG, THE TRoUBLED
CALLING 321 et seq (1965); M. L. GRoss, THE DocTORS ch. 16 (1966); but cf.J. G. BuRRow, AMA-VoICE oF AMmuc MEDICINE (1963); Sethman, Why Not
a Super AMA?, RoCKY MT. MED. J., Nov. 1965, p. 33.
55. 170 A.2d at 800.
56. The New Jersey Supreme Court carefully limits its holding to the facts of
Falcone. It gives no indication what the result will be when an osteopathic
physician who practices osteopathy and who has never been inside a medical school
applies for admission into a county medical society. The intermediate court's
opinion goes beyond this; under it, the fact that an applicant is licensed to practice
medicine and surgery is enough to require his admission to the county medical
society. See 162 A.2d at 333.
57. See Note, Judicially Compelled Admission to Medical Societies-The Fal-
cone Case, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1186, 1194 (1962); Note, Expulsion and Exclusion
From Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 356(1961).
58. See Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and
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leges should have an unlimited scope of practice. The Falcone decision
merely augments this policy.
Since Falcone, three states have considered cases involving exclusion
from voluntary medical associations. In Blende v. Maricopa County Med-
ical Society,5" a licensed M.D. was denied membership in a county medical
society. He brought a mandamus action against it alleging (1) the denial
of membership was arbitrary and capricious; (2) such denial seriously
limited his practice of medicine since society membership was a prerequisite
to staff privileges in the hospitals in the county; (3) the society could deny
him membership only on a showing of just cause. The trial court refused
relief on the ground that a voluntary association may arbitrarily determine
membership. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded setting
out the following guideline: if there is even an informal relationship between
membership in the society and maintenance of staff privileges in local hos-
pitals then the society can deny a licensed physician's application for
membership only upon a showing of just cause.60 The court set forth a
number of factors to be considered in determining whether just cause
exists"1 and indicated by way of dictum that failure to receive four years
of training at a medical school approved by the American Medical Asso-
ciation was just cause. 2
In Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists,6 3 a licensed dentist
was denied membership in an orthodonic society. He sought injunctive
relief, making much the same allegations as were made in the above two
cases. The California District Court of Appeals held that it could and
should inquire into whether the voluntary society in question was acting
"arbitrarily and unlawfully in order to prevent plaintiff from practicing
orthodonics,"64 but that in the case before it there was no arbitrary or
unreasonable action.65
Finally, in Kurk v. Medical Society of County of Queens, Inc.," a
county medical society, acting pursuant to its by-laws, denied a licensed
59. 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964).
60. 393 P.2d at 930.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. 237 Cal. App.2d 265, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905
(1966).
64. 46Cal.Rptr. at 819.
65. The court gives no indications as to what does constitute arbitrary or un-
reasonable action.
66. 46 Misc.2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1965), Rev'd 24 App. Div.2d
867, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965).
19671
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osteopathic physician 7 membership on the ground that he did not com-
plete a four year course in a college of medicine. The Supreme Court,
Queens County, wholeheartedly endorsing Falcone,s directed that the
society admit him on the grounds that the by-laws in question were un-
reasonable and contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, reversed, holding that absent allegations of a monopoly and proof
of economic necessity, 9 the medical society could exclude him from mem-
bership. As the holding indicates, Kurk is factually distinguishable from
Falcone: in Kark the movant merely alleged that he could not obtain
hospital privileges where he desired unless admitted to membership in
the county medical society; there were other hospitals in the county
which did not require membership as a prerequisite to qualification for
hospital privileges. The holding also indicates that if an osteopathic physi-
cian could show either economic necessity or a monopoly then he could
compel admission into a county medical society.70
Thus New Jersey is the only state whose highest court has affirmed a
decree ordering a county medical society to admit an osteopathic physician
to membership-only in New Jersey do osteopaths have any sort of
legal right to belong to a county medical association.
IV. STAFF PRIVILEGES
Twenty-three states have no osteopathic hospitals; 71 in most of the
other twenty-seven, there are just a few such hospitals. For example,
Indiana has one osteopathic hospital;72 New York has four.73 Thus if
osteopathic physicians are to have an unlimited scope of practice it is
essential that they be permitted to use the facilities of allopathic hospitals.
As with regard to exclusion from county medical societies, the courts
67. Kurk was awarded the Doctor of Osteopathy degree in 1960. That same
year he passed the New York examination and received an unlimited license to
practice medicine and surgery in that state. In 1962, without attending any addi-
tional classes, he was awarded the Doctor of Medicine degree by the California
College of Medicine. For an explanation of how this was accomplished, see Crothers,
Those $65 M.D. Degrees: How Good Are They?, MEDICAL EcoNoMICS, May 18,
1964 at 250.
68. 260 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
69. 264 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
70. There is, however, language in Kurk that tends to indicate that the court
will be extremely reluctant to order a county medical society to admit an osteopath
under any circumstances. See 264 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
71. See Mills, Osteopathic Education, 66 J. AMER. OrEOPATHiC Ass'N. 531,
554-560 (1967).
72. Id. at 555.
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have been hesitant to intervene in the exclusion from staff membership
or privileges in hospitals.7 4 In deciding whether to review a hospital's
admission policies, the court's first concern has been the nature of the
hospital-public or private.75 A public hospital is one owned, maintained,
and operated by a governmental unit and supported by governmental
funds; a private hospital on the other hand is one owned, maintained,
and operated by private persons or a corporation, the government having
no voice in its management or control.7 6
An osteopathic physician although duly licensed to engage in the
unlimited practice of medicine or surgery in a state has no constitutional
right, 77 statutory right, 78 or right per se79 to use the facilities of any
public hospital in that state. Admission to these facilities is a privilege,
subject to the rules and regulations of the hospital administration. How-
ever, these rules must be reasonable.8 0 One cannot be excluded from
practice in a public hospital by rules, regulations or acts of government
officials which are arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. s
In Hayman v. Galveston,8 2 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a regulation adopted by the governing board of a munic-
ipal hospital which excluded all osteopaths from practicing in the hospital
was reasonable; it held that it was.83 Eight of the ten other courts which
74. See generally R. P. SLOAN, TOdAY's HosPrrAL ch. 5 (1966); Herring, Hos-
pital Privileges, 14 CLEVE-MAR. L. REv. 472 (1965); Comment, Hospital Staff
Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1965); Note, Physicians'
.Right to Hospital Staff Membership-The Public-Private Dichotomy, 1966 Wash.
U.L.Q. 495.
75. For a detailed study of the administrative organization of the two types
of hospitals see J. A. HAMILTON, PATTERNS OF HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
(1961).
76. See, e.g., Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205,
N.Y.S. 554 (1924), aff'd per curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925); State ex
rel. Sams v. Ohio Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W.Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965); 41
C.J.S., Hospitals § 1 (1944); Note, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 704,705 (1964). For a
discussion of the merits of this distinction, compare Mack, Physician's Use of
Hospital Facilities: Right or Privilege, 8 CLEyE-MAR. L. REv. 437 (1959) with
Perr, Hospital Privileges Revisited, 9 CLEvE-MAR. L. REv. 137 (1960).
77. Cf. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951).
78. Cf. Newton v. Board of Commissioners, 86 Colo. 446, 282 P. 1068 (1929).
79. Cf. Koelling v. Board of Trustees of Mary Skiff Memorial Hosp., (Iowa
1966).
80. See, e.g., Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 850, 852 (1942); 26 Am.Jur., Hospitals and
Asylums, § 9 (1940).
81. For an examination of judicial treatment of public hospital rules, see Note,
Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies,
15 RuTGEas L. REv. 327, 338-43 (1961).
82. 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
83. The hospital involved in Hayman was a municipal hospital in Texas. It
should be noted that under Texas law at that time anyone who offered to treat
19671
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have considered this question have reached a similar conclusion. 4 Most of
them assign no reason for so holding;s others say that the state licensing
laws do not extend the right to use the facilities of public hospitals to
osteopaths.8 6 The reasoning of the two courts in the minority can best be
illustrated by the following excerpt from Morgan v. State.8t
To grant appellant the authority to practice osteopathy and then
deny him the right to have the use of a recognized and useful
facility for the care of his patients . . . is to take away much of
the value and importance of the grant made.8 8
Three courts have considered whether a public hospital's requirement
of membership in a county medical association is a reasonable one. In
Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hospital,9 the court said by way
of dictum that the hospital regulations were reasonable; membership in
the county medical society was one of the regulations. In both Hamilton
County Hospital v. Andrews, ° and Ware v. Benedikt,91 the question of
the reasonableness of a public hospital's requiring membership in a medical
association was squarely before the court. In both cases, the plaintiff was a
licensed medical doctor who was denied admission to the county medical
society and then denied admission to a public hospital because of a by-law
of the hospital requiring medical society membership. In both cases, the
court held the rule unreasonable and discriminatory, reasoning that it was
an invalid delegation to the medical society of the power to determine
who might use the hospital.
any disease by any method was a physician admitted to practice in the state. Tex.
Laws 1920, arts. 5739, 5741, 5745. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why
the Supreme Court was eager to approve a limitation on a "physician's" access to a
hospital.
84. See Newton v. Board of Commissioners, 86 Colo. 446, 282 P. 1068 (1929);
Richardson v. City of Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940); Monroe v. Wall, 66
N.M. 15, 340 P.2d 1069 (1959); Duson v. Poage, 318 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1958, n.r.e.); Williamson v. Grant County Public Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 65
Wash.2d 1245, 396 P.2d 879 (1964); Wallington v. Zinn, 146 W. Va. 147, 118
S.E.2d 526 (1961); cf. Lambing v. Board of Commissioners, 45 Idaho 468, 263 P.
992 (1928); contra Stribling v. Jolley, 241 Mo. App. 1123, 253 S.W.2d 519 (1953);
Morgan v. State, 155 Neb. 247, 51 N.W.2d 382 (1955).
85. See, e.g., Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); Newton v.
Board of Commissioners, supra.
86. See, e.g., Richardson v. City of Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940);
Monroe v. Wall, 66 N.M. 15, 340 P.2d 1069 (1959).
87. 155 Neb. 247, 51 N.W.2d 382 (1952).
88. Id. at 386. For a discussion of how much of the "value and importance"
would be taken away, see R. P. SLoAN, TODAY'S HosprrAL ch 5 (1966).
89. 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955).
90. 227 Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1940), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949).
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In contrast to the requirement of reasonableness with regard to ex-
clusionary rules of public hospitals has been the judicial rule of no review
of private hospital staff decisions. The actions of private hospitals are
said to be within the discretion of the managing authorities, and the
courts have consistently refused to review the actions of private hospitals. 9
2
Thus, private hospitals have excluded a licensed physician from practicing
because he did not receive his training in an American Medical Association
approved medical school; 93 a private hospital may exclude a practitioner
on the ground that he is not a member of the county medical society; 94
and a private hospital is under no obligation to give a reason for exclud-
ing a physician.9 5 The justification for this severe rule was set forth in
Slkulman v. Washington Hosp. Center.98
Judicial tribunals are not equipped to review the action of hospital
authorities in selecting or refusing to appoint members of medical
staffs .... In matters such as these the courts are not in a position
to substitute their judgment for that of professional groups ...
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that due to the shortcomings
of human nature an occasional injustice may result.... The Courts,
however, do not sit to remedy every ill caused by the frailties
of mankind. Their function is but to vindicate and redress legal
wrongs.9 7
In numerous cases, this public-private dichotomy has been attacked. 8
Doctors have argued that privately owned hospitals which receive public
funds should be considered public for purposes of judicial review and
should be subjected to the same reasonableness requirement applied to
hospitals owned by the government. Until recently, this argument was
92. See, e.g., Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Cowan
v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
93. See Osteopathy in Hospitals, 8 PA. D. & C. 273 (1926).
94. See Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organized
Medical Societies, 15 RUrGERS L. REv. 327, 345 (1961); cf. Harris v. Thomas, 217
S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920, n.w.h.).
95. See Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 60, 144 A.2d 341, 345
(1958).
96. 222 F.Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963).
97. Id. at 64. According to one student writer, such reasoning "has no place
in modem jurisprudence .... Courts in this era should not be unmindful of their
duty to protect not only rights which other courts have protected in the past, but
also those rights which necessarily emerge out of the trend toward overlapping
private and public responsibilities." See 18 RutrGas L. REv. 704, 712 (1964).
98. See, e.g., West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1953);
Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942); cf. Mack,
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uniformly rejected.0 9 In the last four years, however, three courts have
examined the exclusionary rules of private hospitals. 10 0
In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,101 a class action
was brought by a group of negro doctors and dentists to restrain two
North Carolina hospitals from refusing them hospital privileges. Both
hospitals met the above definition of private hospitals-they were owned,
maintained and operated by a non-profit corporation; both participated
in the Hill-Burton program; 0 2 and both had previously excluded all negroes
from staff membership. The Fourth Circuit held that participation in the
Hill-Burton program was sufficient involvement with government action
to bring the hospitals' conduct within the fifth and fourteenth amendments
prohibition against racial discrimination. 0 3 It logically follows that the
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable classification would also
apply, and so, at least so far as the Fourth Circuit is concerned, exclusionary
rules of private hospitals must be reasonable.
In Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital,04 the New Jersey Supreme Court
accepted the public-private distinction0 5 but held that a combination of
factors may exist which imbue a private hospital with public aspects. 0
The court said:
[W]hile the managing officials may have discretionary powers in
the selection of the medical staff, those powers are strongly im-
bedded in public aspects, and are rightly viewed . . . as fiduciary
powers to be exercised reasonably and for the public good ...
99. Ibid.
100. It must be noted that during this same period of time, several courts have
expressly endorsed the public-private distinction. See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington
Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963); Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307
Mo. 1965); State v. Ohio Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457(1965).
101. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). For an
excellent in depth analysis of this case, see Note, State Action, State Law, and the
Private Hospital, 62 Mic. L. REv. 1433 (1964).
102. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958).
103. In addition to the federal funds, the court stressed the following aspect
of the Hill-Burton program as constituting government action: (1) right of the
government to recover part of the funds if the hospital is conveyed to persons not
qualified under the Act to receive aid directly; (2) minimum standards and
licensing procedures; (3) federal participation in the actual planning of the pro-
posed facilities; (4) and General's approval of the state program of hospital
construction.
104. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
105. 192 A.2d at 820.
106. The factors deemed important to this finding were govrenment support,
general voluntary support, public dedication in the hospital's charter, and public
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[T]hey must never lose sight of the fact that the hospitals are not
operated for private ends but for the benefit of the public ... 107
In Woodward v. Porter Hospital, Inh., 10 8 the Vermont court adopted the
holding and the reasoning of Greisn w.
Although Simkins and Greisman overlap in the sense that both may
be applicable in a single situation, they are separate and distinct. Under
the former, the test for judicial intervention is sufficient governmental
involvement; under the latter it is the public aspect of the hospital. Also,
under Simkins, the standard to be applied is that of the fifth and fourteenth
amendment; under Greisman, the standard is that of a fiduciary. 109
Greisman is significant also because of the by-laws there involved:
an applicant for membership on the courtesy staff must be a graduate of
a medical school approved by the American Medical Association and must
be a member of the County Medical Society. Greisman was neither; he
had graduated from the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy, and, because
of his schooling, his application to the County Medical Society was never
acted upon. In holding the by-laws unreasonable, the court simply extended
Falcone to private hospitals.110
Greismn represents an extension of Falcone in still a second respect.
In Falcone, the court conditioned its judicial intervention on the existence
of a monopoly power in the county medical association. In Greisman, there
was a hospital which allowed osteopathic physicians to use its facilities
that was only seven and a half miles from one of Greisman's offices and
fourteen miles from the other yet the court said:
[N]or does it suffice to say that there are other hospitals outside
the metropolitan Vineland area, for they may be too distant or
unsuitable to his needs and desires."'
Thus, in New Jersey, an osteopathic physician must be given full con-
sideration when he applies for staff privileges in a private hospital regard-
less of other available hospital facilities. 112 It is only logical that the same
would be true as to public hospitals.
107. 192 A.2d at 824, 825.
108. 217 A.2d 37 (Vt. 1966).
109. See Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 92 N.J. Super. 163, 222 A.2d 530,
540 (1966).
110. 192 A.2d at 824.
111. Ibid.
112. See Schneir v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 91 N.J. Super. 527, 221 A.2d 559(1966); but cf. 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 704, 712 (1964).
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It seems that the state of the law as to hospital privileges is much
the same as it is with regard to staff membership. In New Jersey, an
osteopath is judicially protected; a hospital can exclude him, but not
because he is an osteopath. In Missouri and Nebraska 13 the same is true
when the hospital involved is a public one. This is not to say that these
three states are the only ones in which osteopaths have hospital privileges
in hospitals other than osteopathic hospitals. There are hospitals in the
other states that extend their facilities to osteopathic physicians." 4 They
are, however, relatively few and far between.
V. MERGER DEVELOPMENTS
Although the osteopathic counterpart of the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the American Osteopathic Association, strongly advocates that
doctors of osteopathy have the same scope of practice as allopathic phy-
sicians, it has consistently opposed any form of merger between the two
schools of healing. Undoubtedly, this stand is in part motivated by a
selfish desire to preserve the organization. The seemingly dominant reason,
however, for the anti-merger view is a genuine desire to perpetuate osteo-
pathic theories and methods." 5 Osteopaths feel that osteopathic medicine
is distinctive and distinguishable from allopathic medicine, and that
merger would result in destruction through absorption.", Despite this op-
position, medical societies in three states, California, Washington, and
Michigan, have with varying degrees of success recently attempted to
bring about a merger of allopathic and osteopathic physicians.
Prior to 1961, California was no different from the majority of the
states with regard to the scope of practice of an osteopathic physician:
he had the right to use drugs or surgery in his practice but no judicially
enforceable right to either county medical society membership or hospital
staff privileges." 7 In 1961, the California Medical Society and the California
Osteopathic Society effected a merger." 8 There were many facets to the
113. See note 84 supra.
114. See American Osteopathic Association, PARTIAL LISTING MEDICAL Hospi-
TALS USED JOINTLY BY D.O.'s Arm M.D.'s (1966).
115. See American Osteopathic Association, BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF OSTEOPATHIC
MEDICINE AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OSTEOPATHIC PROFESSION TO HEALTH
CARE 7, 13 (2d ed. 1966).
116. See G. NoRTHUP, OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE: AN AMERICAN REFORMATION
70-74 (1966).
117. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 3600.
118. Negotiations had sporadically taken place for a period of approximately
thirty years. See Brief for Respondent, p. 62, Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons of
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merger contract,119 but the principal factors were (1) that the California
College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons must be converted to a
medical school; (2) osteopaths holding an unlimited license to practice
medicine in California were awarded M.D. degrees;'20 (3) that doctors of
osteopathy having these M.D. degrees be required to elect under which
degree-D.O. or M.D.-they wished to practice; (4) that legislation to
deny reciprocity licensure to future D.O. applicants become effective;' 12
(5) that Board of Osteopathic Examiners continue only as an agency to
relicense those D.O.'s who chose not to practice as M.D.'s.12
Surprisingly, the merger was not welcomed by all osteopathic physi-
cians practicing in California.123 Approximately twenty-five per cent of
the osteopathic physicians in the state for one reason or another 2 4 elected
to continue practice as D.O.'s. They united to form the Osteopathic Physi-
cians and Surgeons of California and brought an action attacking the
validity of the merger. It was charged that the agreement was an inten-
tional interference with the right of osteopaths to pursue lawful business,
a violation of the anti-trust laws, a violation of state statues prohibiting
the sale of medical degrees, and an ultra vires act of the corporate Califor-
nia Osteopathic Associations. All contentions were rejected.125
It is extremely difficult to make any sort of accurate statement as to
what, if any, effect the merger has had on the scope of practice of the
D.O.'s turned M.D.'s. Only with regard to membership in county medical
societies is change discernable. After the merger agreement, the doctors
of osteopathy who obtained their M.D. degrees and elected to practice
as such did not automatically become members of the medical society in
the county in which they resided or practiced. Instead, they were assigned
119. The terms of the merger agreement are set out at 36 Cal. Rptr. 647 et seq.
120. In New York State Osteopathic Society, Inc. v. Allen, 51 Misc.2d 849,
273 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1966), the New York court refused to recognize this M.D. degree.
No other court has considered this question. See generally Crothers, Those $65
M.D. Degrees: How Good Are They?, MEDICAL ECONOMICS, May 18, 1964, at 250.
121. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2396.
122. Ibid.
123. The Executive Secretary of the Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons of
California speaks of the merger as "prostituting a degree long honored." See Letter
from David J. Rodgers to David G. Epstein, March 13, 1967.
124. These four hundred and fifty three persons consist of four groups: (1)
osteopaths holding an unlimited license to practice in California who practice in
other states; (2) osteopaths in California who do not hold an unlimited license to
practice; (3) osteopaths practicing in California under an unlimited license who for
one reason or another were denied an M.D. degree; (4) osteopaths practicing in
California under an unlimited license who chose not to obtain an M.D. degree.
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to a separate state-wide society composed of only former osteopathic phy-
sicians. 120 Today, most of these ex-D.O.'s are now members of the reg-
ular county medical societies.127
The Washington merger is much more informal. There the state med-
ical society established a medical college, set up a ten day course, and
awarded an M.D. degree to the osteopaths who completed the course.ms
Several of these new M.D.'s then applied to the Washington Division
of Professional Licensing for an M.D. license. At present none have been
issued pursuant to the merger; the Division of Professional Licensing
refuses to take such action until the courts approve the merger. 2 9
Finally, in Michigan, merger has been delayed, if not permanently
defeated. In 1966, the House Affairs Committee of the Michigan state
legislature sent each osteopath a questionnaire inquiring whether "amal-
gamation of allopathy and osteopathy would be in the best interest of
the people of the state."'130 Almost ninety percent' 3' of the osteopaths
replied to the questionnaire: 1,338 answered "no"; 195 replied "yes." 132
CONCLUSION
A determination of whether a doctor of osteopathy is as competent
as a medical doctor is beyond the scope of this paper.133 The question
is complex and controversial and involves primarily non-legal considerations.
Regardless of whether John Doe, D.O., is now the professional equal of
126. See Aspinwall, This M. D. Works in a D. 0. Hospital, MEDICAL ECONOMICS,
Feb. 24, 1964, 111, 126.
127. Letter from David J. Rodgers to David Epstein, April 15, 1967.
128. Once again the state osteopathic association is opposed to any form of
merger with M.D.'s. See Letter from Dr. Leo A. Hoover, Secretary, Washington
Osteopathic Medical Association, to David Epstein, April 24, 1967.
129. See Letter from Thomas A. Carter, Administrator, State of Washington
Division of Professional Licensing, to David Epstein, March 13, 1967.
130. Medical World News, April 15, 1966, at 99.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid. The same questionnaire was mailed to every M.D. in the state. Only
two thirds responded: 5,520 voted for the merger; 1,34 voted against it.
133. In some states M.D.'s and D.O.'s take the same licensure examinations.
There is no clear difference in their scores. See Medical Licensure Statistics, 196
JAMA 857, 858 (1966). Chicago College of Osteopathy requires that all applicants
take the Medical College Admission Test, as do all medical schools. The scores
of the successful applicants to the Chicago school are quite similar to the scores
of successful applicants to the medical schools. See Sedlacek, The Study of Appli-
cants 1965-66, J. Ma. ED., January, 1967, p. 28. The above supports the statement
by the Secretary to the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners that "ETjhere is
no difference in the two (osteopaths and medical doctors) as far as their medical
and surgery ability is concerned." Letter from M. H. Crabb, M.D., to David
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John Doe, M.D., he should be. This nation is now experiencing a severe
shortage of trained physicians; it is senseless to waste any healing talent
or training. Accordingly, an osteopathic physician's background and pro-
fessional education should be such that the standard of the treatment
that he gives equals that of an allopathic physician, and the law should be
such that the scope of practice that he has is also equal.1
134. See Silver, Physician Shortage, Health Manpower and National Policy,
Hospital Tribune, p. 6, July 3, 1967. This has prompted the AMA to adopt a
resolution, to, "begin negotiations directed toward the beginning official change of
schools of osteopathy to schools of medicine." See, Report of Board of Trustees,
Report E, adopted by the House of Delegates, June, 1967.
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